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Wisconsin Attorney General Opinions
Opinion # OAG 19-85,
21 May 1985
Public Officials;
Schools And School Districts;
Section 118.12(1)(a), Stats., applies
only to
materials and items that are part
of or
reasonably could become part of
a school
district's instructional process;
enforcement authority usually lies
with the
school board president for the
district;
violations of Section 118.12(1)(a)
could
possibly constitute violations
of Sections
946.12 and 946.13.
DR. HERBERT J. GROVER,
State Superintendent
Department of Public
Instruction
You have sought my opinion on the
following
questions relating to Section 118.12(1),
Stats.:
1. Is it a violation of Section
118.12(1)(a) for a
teacher to distribute
advertising material
to students
offering books and
periodicals for
sale to students when:
a. the books or periodicals
are not
used for instruction in the
schools, or
b. the distributed
material has been
approved by the school board or
school administration in order to
promote reading activities by
students outside the classroom?
2. Is it a violation of Section
118.12(1)(a) for a
school administrator
or school employe
to arrange for:
a. students to rent
from a private
company graduation caps and gowns
to be used in the school's
graduation ceremony?
b. the in-school sale
of graduation
announcements, class rings, or
other school jewelry to students?
c. students to have
their yearbook
pictures taken by a particular
photographer, who supplies film and
photographic equipment to the
school's newspaper and
journalism classes?
d. students to sell
candy or other
food products to the public where
the proceeds go to a school
program, such as the school band?
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3. Is it a violation of Section
118.12(1)(a) for a
school employe who
develops and owns
an educational
computer program to:
a. sell the program
to the school
district in which she/he is
employed? What if the employe
has no involvement in the
district's decision to buy the
program?
b. sell the program
to a cooperative
educational service agency (CESA)
which is located in and serves the
same area as the employing school
district?
c. sell the program
to students as a
"study aid"? What if the "study
aid" is not used by any of the
employe's students?
4. Is it a violation of Section
118.12(1)(a) for a
teacher to sell items
which may be used
as school books,
supplies or equipment
during the summer
vacation period?
5. Who is responsible for enforcing
Section 118.12?
6. Would violations of Section 118.12(1)(a)
also be considered
criminal conduct
under the provisions
of either Section
946.12, Misconduct
in public office or
Section 946.13, Private
interest in
public contract prohibited?
My general answers, which will be
elaborated
upon, are that Section 118.12(1)(a)
applies
only to materials and items that
are or
reasonably could become part of
the
instructional programs of a school
district;
that enforcement authority usually
lies with
the school board president for
the district:
and that violations of Section
118.12(1)(a)
could also constitute violations
of
Sections 946.12 and 946.13.
Section 118.12(1) reads as follows:
118.12(1)(a)
Within the school district of his
or her
jurisdiction or employment, no
school
teacher, agency administrator or
employe, school district administrator
or other school employe connected
with
any public school may act as an
agent or
solicitor for the sale of school
books,
school supplies or school equipment,
or
solicit or promote such sales to
individuals or the school district
or
receive any fee or reward for any
such
sales.
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118.12(1)(b)
Any person violating this subsection
shall forfeit not less than $50
nor more
than $200 for each offense and
may be
removed from office therefor.
The broad purpose behind this statute
was
described by one of my predecessors.
In 12 Op. Att'y Gen. 72 (1923),
it was stated that
the purpose of the
statute is manifestly
to prevent persons
connected with the
public school system
from having their
judgments warped by
financial interest
in the sale of school
supplies.
Similarly, in
27 Op. Att'y Gen. 267, 268-69 (1938),
it was stated:
From the wording of
the statute taken as
a whole, it is apparent
that at the time
of the enactment thereof
the legislature
recognized that the
persons named
therein might be in
a position to take
an unfair advantage
either of the school
or of the students
attending such a
school and it was
to prevent such an
abuse that the statute
was enacted.
The key to answering the majority
of your
questions lies in the proper interpretation
of the phrase
"school books, school
supplies
or school equipment."
As you correctly point out in your
request,
the phrase prior to 1961 read "school
books,
maps, charts, school library books,
school
furniture, apparatus or stationery."
In 1961 this language was changed
to read, as
it does currently, "school books,
school
supplies or school equipment."
See Chapter 253, Laws of 1961.
The drafting record for chapter
253, Laws of
1961, contains no explanation for
the change.
In fact, the drafting file seems
to indicate
that the Legislature was focusing
only upon
the class of persons to whom Section
118.
12(1)(a) (then, Section 40.93) would apply.
In my opinion, then, the reworking
of the
phrase "school books, maps, charts,
school
library books, school furniture,
apparatus or
stationery" was of little consequence.
The old phrase was perhaps more
explicit and
more obviously applicable only
to items that
are tied to a school's instructional
process.
However, in the absence of any legislative
history, other than what I have
already
discussed.
I do not believe that the current
phrase
should be construed any differently.
Accordingly, I could interpret the
phrase
"school books, school supplies
or school
equipment" to apply only to books,
supplies
and equipment which are or reasonably
could
become tied to a school's instructional
process.
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I.
Applying this definition to subpart
(a) of
your first question, related to
a teacher
distributing advertising materials
to
students offering books and periodicals
for
sale, it is my opinion that a teacher
cannot
distribute such materials if the
books and
periodicals being advertised are
or
reasonably could become instructional
materials within the district.
If the books and periodicals are
or
reasonably could be used in the
classroom,
or are or reasonably could become
part of
the collection in a school library
or
instructional materials center,
then
they constitute "school books"
within
the meaning of Section 118.12(1)(a).
Further, the teacher would be "promoting"
a sale to "an individual."
Even if the teacher did not receive
remuneration of any sort, the statute
still appears to stand in the
way of such advertising.
A person cannot "solicit" or "promote"
or "receive any fee or reward."
The use of disjunctives suggests
that
promoting a sale is different than
receiving
a payment or royalty or bonus for
a sale.
The statute appears to bar even
advocating
sales of books and periodicals.
Subpart (b) of your first question
asks
whether it makes any difference
if the
materials being advertised have
been approved
by the school board or school administration
in order to promote reading activities
by
students outside the classroom.
In my opinion, a violation of Section
118.12(1)(a) would occur whenever
a teacher
distributes advertising materials
relating
to books and periodicals which
have been
approved by the school board to
promote
outside reading.
The reason is that such materials
could
very well become part of a district's
instructional program or part of
a
district's library collection.
II.
The items set forth in question
2 Ä caps and
gowns, graduation announcements,
class rings
and other school jewelry, yearbook
pictures
and candy and other food products
sold by
students to the public Ä do not,
in my
view, constitute "school books,
school
supplies or school equipment."
These items are generally sold on
a periodic
basis only, are not part of the
ongoing
curriculum and are not a part of
the
instructional process within a
school district.
Thus, in my opinion, Section 118.12(1)(a)
does not apply to these items.
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III.
Your third question focuses upon
educational
computer programs and how they
are to be
handled under Section 118.12(1)(a).
As a preliminary matter, I would
note that
although Section 118.12(1)(a) uses
the terms
"school books," "school supplies"
and "school
equipment," these terms should
not be given a
technical meaning.
In my opinion, the terms were meant
to be comprehensive.
That is, they were meant to encompass
all items which are proper to be
used in the instructional process.
Computer programs, in my opinion,
constitute
instructional materials.
Accordingly, in response to subpart
(a) of
your third question, it is my opinion
that if
a school district employe or other
person
specified in Section 118.12(1)(a)
develops an
educational computer program, that
person
cannot sell the program to the
district by
which he or she is employed if
the program is
or reasonably could become part
of the
district's instructional materials.
In further response to subpart (a)
of your
third question, I do not believe
that it
makes any difference that the person
may not
be involved in the district's decision
to buy
the program.
A sale of this nature would still
generate a
"fee or reward" for the seller,
and thus it
is clearly prohibited by the statute.
In response to subpart (b) of your
third
question, selling a computer program
to a
cooperative educational service
agency (CESA)
is, in my opinion, a nearly indistinguishable
situation, given the agency relationship
between CESAs and the districts
they serve.
Hence, programs should not be sold
to the
CESA that serves the district by
which
the seller is employed or with
which
the seller is connected.
Lastly, you ask in subpart (c) whether
it
makes any difference if the program
is sold as a "study aid."
Again, I believe that the guiding
principle
should be whether or not the program
is or
could reasonably become part of
the
instructional process that takes
place within the school district.
If it is part of the instructional
process or
reasonably could become so in the
future,
then in my opinion the educational
computer
program, however it may be labelled,
falls
within the parameters of the phrase
"school
books, school supplies or school
equipment."
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IV.
Your fourth question asks whether
it is a
violation of Section 118.12(1)(a)
for a
teacher to sell items which may
be used
as school books, supplies or equipment
during the summer vacation period.
I find nothing in Section 118.12(1)
that
would lead to a conclusion that
sales,
solicitation and promotional activities
related to books, supplies and
equipment used
during summer months can be viewed
any
differently than sales, solicitations
and
promotional activities relating
to materials
used during the traditional academic
year.
V.
Your fifth question focuses upon
enforcement of Section 118.12(1).
In my opinion, enforcement authority
lies with the school board president
within each district.
The penalty for violating Section
118.12(1)(a) is a forfeiture of
not
less than fifty dollars and not
more
han two hundred dollars for each
offense,
and possible removal from office.
Section 120.15(4) states clearly
that the
school district president (the
president of a
school board) of a common or union
district
is responsible for prosecuting
"any action for the
recovery of
any forfeiture incurred
under
Chapters 115 to 121
in which
the school district
is interested."
If the school district president
has incurred
the forfeiture, then Section 120.15(4)
hands
prosecutorial authority to the
school
district treasurer.
While by its terms Section 120.15
applies
only to common or union high school
districts, the Section is also
made
applicable to city school districts
and unified school districts by
Sections 120.49 and 120.75.
These Sections specify that the
school boards
and school officers of city districts
and
union districts have the same powers
and
duties as the boards and officers
of a
common school district.
One situation unique to a city district,
however, is that if the board president
is
the one who incurs a forfeiture
for violating
Section 118.12(1)(a), prosecutorial
authority
then passes to the city treasurer.
The reason is that under Section
120.48(2)
the city treasurer serves as the
treasurer of
the school board in a city school
district.
I would also note that if a person
charged
with prosecuting violations of
Section
118.12(1)(a) fails to prosecute
within ten
days after being requested in writing
by
an elector of the school district
to do so,
any elector of the school district
may then
prosecute the action.
Section 118.12(3), Stats.
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An action under Section 118.12(1)(a)
would,
in my opinion, be covered by chapter
778.
Section 778.01 states that
"where a forfeiture imposed
by statute
shall be incurred
it may be recovered
in a civil action
. . . ."
Section 778.02 states that
"every such forfeiture action
shall be
in the name of the
state of Wisconsin."
The persons authorized to "prosecute"
violations of Section 118.12(1)(a),
however, may not proceed alone
in filing a civil action.
In
State v. Wisconsin Telephone Co.,
91 Wis.2d 702, 713,
284 N.W.2d 41 (1979),
the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted
its
"disapproval of private persons
purporting to bring
actions
on behalf of the state."
In regard to a statutory Section
which
contained the phrase "the person
or
corporation prosecuting thereof,"
the court
concluded that the phrase cannot
be construed
to mean that a private person could
commence
a forfeiture action alone, and
thus force the
state to become a party.
Rather, it must be held to mean
that a
private person could prosecute
in conjunction
with the state pursuant to Section
288.04
[now Section 778.04], which provides
in part,
"In case a portion of any
forfeiture
shall belong or shall
be payable to any
person, he may join
with the state as a
plaintiff; . ."
Wisconsin Telephone, 91 Wis.2d at 713-14.
Based upon this case, I conclude
that the
authority to "prosecute" violations
of
Section 118.12(1)(a) means that
the persons
given this authority may only make
the sworn
relation upon which a prosecuting
authority
of the state bases a forfeiture
action; no
independent prosecutorial authority
exists
under Section 118.12.
VI.
Your sixth and final question asks
whether
violations of Section 118.12(1)(a)
could also
constitute criminal conduct under
Sections
946.12 (misconduct in public office)
and
946.13 (private interest in a public
contract).
In my opinion, violations of Section
118.12(1)(a) could constitute violations
of
the latter statutes.
Both Sections 946.12 and 946.13
apply to
public officers and public employes.
The definitions of the terms "public
officer"
and "public employe" are set forth
in Section
939.22(30).
A "public officer" is any person
"appointed
or elected according to law to
discharge a
public duty for the state or one
of its
subordinate governmental units."
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A "public employe" is any person,
not an
officer, who "performs any official
function
on behalf of the state or one of
its
subordinate governmental units
and who
is paid from the public treasury
of the
state or subordinate governmental
unit."
In my opinion, those categories
of persons
bound by Section 118.12(1)(a):school
teachers, agency administrators
or employes,
school district administrators
or other
school employes easily fall within
the definitions of either a public
officer or public employe.
An analysis of a predecessor to
Sections
946.12 and 946.13 supports this
conclusion.
Section 348.28, Stats. (1953), whose
principles were incorporated into
Sections
946.12 and 946.13 by chapter 696,
Laws of
1955, specified that the Section
applied to,
among others, "any officer, agent
or clerk of
. . any school district or school
board . . .
or in the employment thereof."
It appears that the Legislature,
when
adopting Sections 946.12 and 946.13,
simply condensed the lengthy list
down into two general categories:
public officers and public employes.
There is no indication that school
district
officers, teachers or other district
employes were to be excluded.
Given that the persons described
in Section
118.12(1)(a) are also covered by
Sections
946.12 and 946.13, it is conceivable
that
conduct punishable under Section
118.12(1)(a)
could be punishable also under
the other two
statutory Sections, depending upon
the facts.
No double jeopardy problem arises
since the
penalties under Section 118.12
are civil.
Double jeopardy problems only arise
if a
person is subjected to two possible
criminal
penalties for the same conduct.
State v. Roggensack,
15 Wis.2d 625, 633,
13 N.W.2d 389 (1962).
BCL:RCB
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