Wisconsin Attorney General Opinions
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Opinion # OAG 43-85,
7 November 1985
Notary Public; Public Officials;
Residence, Domicile, And Legal
Settlement;
Sections 137.01(1) and (2), Stats.,
which
requires Wisconsin residency as
a condition
of appointment as notary public
in Wisconsin,
does not violate the Privileges
and
Immunities Clause of the Federal
Constitution
and should be complied with unless
and until
it is declared invalid by a court
of
competent jurisdiction in a proper
case.
DOUGLAS LA FOLLETTE, Secretary of State
You request my opinion whether those
provisions of Sections 137.01(1)
and (2),
Stats., which require Wisconsin
residency as
a condition of being a notary public,
violate
article IV, Section 2, clause I
of the United
States Constitution, commonly known
as the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
For the reasons hereinafter stated,
it is my opinion that they do not.
Section 137.01 is a duly enacted
statute
which is entitled to a strong presumption
of constitutionality.
A heavy burden is placed on a party
making a
constitutional challenge and, if
any
reasonable doubt exists, it must
be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality
of the statute.
In the Matter of Guardianship of
Nelson,
98 Wis.2d 261, 296 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
Section 137.01(1) is applicable
to notaries
public who are not attorneys and
Subsection
137.01(1)(a) provides that
the governor shall appoint notaries
public who shall be Wisconsin residents
and at least 18 years of age.
Subsection 137.01(2) provides that
any Wisconsin resident
who is licensed
to practice law in
this state is
entitled to a permanent
commission
as a notary public
upon application
to the secretary of
state and
payment of a $15 fee.
The application presently before
you is from
an attorney who was admitted to
practice law
in Wisconsin on February 22, 1985
but is a
California resident who maintains
his
principal office in Santa Monica,
California.
He claims that a permanent commission
as notary public
would be an indispensable part of
practicing law in Wisconsin.
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Our supreme court has noted that
the contours
of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause
are not well developed.
Taylor v. Conta,
106 Wis.2d 321, 330,
316 N.W.2d 814 (1982).
In Taylor, our court used a three-step
inquiry to determine whether the
challenged
statute was constitutional under
the clause.
The court must find that a fundamental
right or privilege is involved.
To justify different treatment with
respect
to a privilege, the state must
prove there is
a substantial reason for discrimination
and
the means employed must bear a
substantial
relationship to legitimate state
objectives.
The court held that in matters of
taxation,
because nonresidents may present
special
problems for administration of
state laws,
the state need not grant nonresidents
precisely the same rights it grants
to residents.
The court held that Wisconsin need
not grant
a nonresident deduction with respect
to
moving expenses incurred in connection
with
production of income outside Wisconsin
and
may tax the gain on the sale of
a principal
Wisconsin residence if the new
residence is
purchased outside the state even
though tax
on the gain would be deferred if
the new
principal residence were located
in
Wisconsin.
In Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper,
105 S.Ct.
1272 (1985), the United States
Supreme Court
applied a similar three-step analysis
in
determining that New Hampshire's
exclusion of
nonresidents from the bar violated
the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
The Court first found that the practice
of
law was a protected "privilege"
under article
IV, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution, and then concluded
that there
was no substantial reason for the
difference
in treatment between residents
and
nonresidents and that the discrimination
practiced against the nonresidents
did not
bear a substantial relationship
to any
legitimate state objective.
Piper lived in Vermont, just across
the
Connecticut River, which divides
her
state from New Hampshire.
The Court ruled 8-1 in favor of Piper.
Justice Byron White wrote a separate
concurring opinion saying that
the residency
requirement was invalid only as
it applied to
Piper because she lives so close
to the state
line.
In Piper, the state argued that
the
Privileges and Immunities Clause
should not
be applicable to the practice of
law because
attorneys' activities are crucial
to the
administration of justice and inextricably
bound up with the exercise of judicial
power.
Relying on In Re Griffiths, 413
U.S. 717
(1973), the Court held that attorneys
do not
really exercise actual governmental
power.
In Griffiths, the Court specifically
said
that although it did not wish to
denigrate
in any way the great responsibility
that the
power to administer oaths entails,
it hardly
involved matters of state policy
or
acts of such unique responsibility
as to
entrust them only to citizens.
Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 724.
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One of the privileges guaranteed
nonresidents
by the Privileges and Immunities
Clause is
the privilege of engaging in certain
businesses in a state on terms
of substantial
equality with the residents of
that state.
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
It can be argued that being a notary
public
is advantageous to the practice
of law, and
that a member of the Wisconsin
Bar, who is a
resident of Minnesota but practices
in
Wisconsin, might be at a disadvantage
if he
or she is not allowed to be a notary
public.
Any such disadvantage would be de
minimis as
there are thousands of notaries
public and
other officials in Wisconsin who
are
empowered to take oaths, attestations
and certify depositions who would
be
available to any non-resident attorney
on a statutory fee basis.
The facts here are
distinguishable from Piper.
There the Court found that the practice
of
law should be considered a "fundamental
right" and that
out-of-state lawyers may Ä and often
do Ä represent persons who raise
unpopular federal claims.
In some cases, representation by
nonresident counsel may be the
only
means available for the vindication
of federal rights.
Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1277.
We do not believe the same importance
can be
attached to any need to import
a non-resident
notary public into Wisconsin.
Piper is also distinguishable because
no public office was involved.
An attorney is an officer of the
court for
some purposes, but is not a public
officer.
It is my opinion that the acts which
a notary can perform do not
constitute the practice of law.
One doesn't have to be a notary
public to be
an attorney or to engage in the
law business
and one doesn't have to be in the
practice of
law or be an attorney to be a notary
public.
Further, being a notary public is
not
usually considered a business or
occupation in and of itself.
In my opinion, a nonresident does
not have a
fundamental right to engage in
the activities
delegated by the Legislature to
notaries
public.
Sections 137.01(5), (6), (6m) and,
7)
provides:
137.01(5) Powers.
Notaries public have
power to act
throughout the state.
Notaries public have
power to demand
acceptance of foreign
and inland bills
of exchange and payment
thereof, and
payment of promissory
notes, and may
protest the same for
nonacceptance or
nonpayment may administer
oaths, take
depositions and acknowledgments
of
deeds, and perform
such other duties as
by the law of nations,
or according to
commercial usage,
may be exercised and
performed by notaries
public.
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137.01(6) Authentication.
137.01(6)(a)
The secretary of state
may certify to
the official qualifications
of any
notary public and
to the genuineness of
his signature and
seal or rubber stamp.
137.01(6)(b)
Whenever any notary
public has filed in
the office of the
clerk of circuit court
of his county of residence
his
signature, an impression
of his official
seal or imprint of
his official rubber
stamp and a certificate
of the secretary
of state, such clerk
may certify to the
official qualifications
of such notary
public and the genuineness
of his
signature and seal
or rubber stamp.
137.01(6)(c)
Any certificate specified
under this
Subsection shall be
presumptive evidence
of the facts therein
stated.
137.01(6m)
Change of Residence.
A notary public shall
not vacate his
office by reason of
his change of
residence within the
state.
Written notice of any change
of address
shall be given to the secretary
of state
within 5 days of such change.
137.01(7)
Official Records To Be Filed.
When any notary public
ceases to hold
office he, or in case
of his death his
executor or administrator,
shall deposit
his official records
and papers in the
office of the clerk
of the circuit court
of the county of his
residence.
If any such notary
or any executor or
administrator, after
such records and
papers come to his
hands, neglects
for 3 months to deposit
them he
shall forfeit not
less than $50
nor more than $500.
If any person knowingly
destroys,
defaces or conceals
any records or
papers of any notary
public he shall
forfeit not less than
$50 nor more than
$500, and shall be
liable to the party
injured for all damages
thereby
sustained.
The clerks of the circuit
courts shall
receive and safely
keep all such papers
and records in their
office.
Section 17.03 provides:
Any public office is
deemed vacant upon
the happening of any
of the following
events, except as
otherwise provided:
. . . .
17.03(4)
His or her ceasing
to be an
inhabitant of this
state . . .
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Even if we assume that the activities
which a
notary public engages in do constitute
a
privilege within the Privileges
and
Immunities Clause, Wisconsin can
limit
appointments to persons who have
bona fide
residence within the state, because
there is
substantial reason for the difference
in
treatment between residents and
nonresidents
and any discrimination bears a
substantial
relationship to a legitimate state
objective.
Wisconsin places great importance
upon the
right of any member of the public
to inspect
and copy public records.
Secs. 19.31-19.37, Stats.
A notary public, as a public officer,
is the legal custodian of the
records in his or her office.
Although notaries public do not
necessarily
have a large number of retained
records which
would be subject to inspection
and copying,
there would be some.
Section 137.01(7) requires that
when a notary
public ceases to hold office, he
shall
deposit his official records and
papers
in the office of the clerk of the
circuit court of the county of
his residence.
In order for a member of the public
to have a
meaningful right to inspect and
copy public
records in the hands of a notary
public,
such offices must have some place
within the
state where such records are maintained.
Section 19.34, Stats.
There is no indication that the
applicant who
has a California residence would
maintain
an office in Wisconsin.
His office in California is not
just across
the river in an adjacent state
as in Piper,
but across many rivers and five
states.
As early as 1881, our supreme court
held that
a notary public was an officer
of the state
and, under the then laws,
it was necessary for him to reside
in
some county in the state in order
to
qualify him to hold the office.
Having such residence, and thus
being
qualified, he had power to act
in any
county in the state."
Maxwell v. Hartman and another,
imp.,
50 Wis. 660, 665,
8 N.W. 103 (1881).
A notary public is a statutory state
officer
appointed pursuant to statute as
the
Legislature may prescribe rather
than an
officer of the court such as an
attorney.
Wis. Const. art. XIII, Section 9.
In 63 Op. Att'y Gen. 74 (1974),
it was stated
that the position of notary public
is an
office of trust, profit or honor
in this
state subject to article XIII,
Section 3
of the Wisconsin Constitution.
In State ex rel. Wisconsin Dev.
Authority v.
Damman, 228 Wis. 147, 163, 277
N.W. 278
(1938), it was held that a person
not an
elector of this state is ineligible
to hold
public office therein, although
the
constitution and statutes do not
expressly so ordain.
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In
Martin v. Smith,
239 Wis. 314, 332, 333,
1 N.W.2d 163 (1941),
the court was concerned with eligibility
of a federal officer to hold a
state office
under article XIII, Section 3 of
the
Wisconsin Constitution.
The court held that the president
of the
university was not a public officer
and
noted, 239 Wis. at 333:
It may seem anomalous to some that
the
president of a great university
should
not be a public officer while a
justice
of the peace or a notary public
is a
public officer.
The court stated, 239 Wis. at 332:
It is certain that
a person employed
cannot be a public
officer, however
chosen, unless there
is devolved upon
him by law the exercise
of some portion
of the sovereign power
of the state.
The court included notaries public
within
those public officers who do exercise
some
part of the sovereign power of
the state.
Section 137.01(5) specifically restricts
a Wisconsin notary public to notarial
acts within the state.
I am aware that in Bernal v. Fainter,
104 S.Ct. 2312 (1984), the Court
held
that a statutory requirement in
Texas,
that a notary public be a citizen
of the
United States, was unconstitutional.
Under Texas law, notaries authenticate
written instruments, administer
oaths
and take out-of-court depositions.
The court stated:
It has never deemed
the source of a
position whether it
derives from a
State's statute or
its Constitution
as the dispositive
factor in determining
whether a State may
entrust the position
only to citizens.
Rather, this Court
has always looked
to the actual function
of the
position as the dispositive
factor.
The focus of our inquiry
has been
whether a position
was such that the
officeholder would
necessarily exercise
broad discretionary
power over the
formulation or execution
of public
policies importantly
affecting the
citizen population
Ä power of the sort
that a self-governing
community could
properly entrust only
to full-fledged
members of that community.
Bernal, 104 S.Ct. at 2318.
The Court held that a notary's duties,
important as they are, hardly implicate
responsibilities that go to the
heart
of representative government.
Rather, these duties are essentially
clerical and ministerial.
Bernal, 104 S.Ct. at 2319.
The Court referred to In re Griffiths
and noted that
if it is improper to
apply the political
function exception
to a citizenship
requirement governing
eligibility for
membership in a State
bar, it would be
anomalous to apply
the exception to the
citizenship requirement
that governs
eligibility to become
a Texas notary.
Bernal, 104 S. Ct. at 2320.
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Bernal is distinguishable on
a number of grounds.
The Court was not concerned with
the
Privileges and Immunities Clause,
but with
the Equal Protection Clause contained
in
the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.
The case was concerned with citizenship
and not residency.
The applicant, a native of Mexico,
was a resident of Texas and proposed
to utilize authority to act as
a notary
in his work in Texas.
The Texas statute provided that
a
notary public must be a citizen
of the United States.
Bernal, 104 S.Ct. at 2316, cites
In re
Griffiths, but that case involved
the right
of a resident alien to become licensed
to
practice law, not to hold public
office.
Even in Griffiths, there was residency
in the
state in which the person intended
to become
licensed and pursue her profession.
Performance of the acts a notary
public is
authorized to engage in do not
constitute a
"fundamental right" to which the
Privileges
and Immunities Clause extends.
Wisconsin has a long history of
treating
a notary public as holding an important
public office.
Such officer exercises a portion
of
the sovereign power of the state.
Notaries public have, in some cases,
been viewed as political officers.
Such officers are required to preserve
their
records and make such records available
for
inspection and copying during office
hours
and to have their records filed
with the
clerk of court of their county
of residence
in case of resignation or death.
In my opinion, the provisions of
Sections
137.01(1) and (2), which require
Wisconsin
residency as a condition of being
appointed
a notary public, do not violate
the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.
The statutory provisions are presumed
valid
and you should require compliance
with their
terms unless and until they are
held invalid
by a court of competent jurisdiction
in a
proper case.
BCL:RJV
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