State ex rel.
Journal/Sentinel v. Arreola,
207 Wis.2d 496 (Ct.App. 1996)
558 N.W.2d 670
State ex rel.
Journal/Sentinel and Anne Bothwell,
Petitioners-Respondents,
v.
Philip Arreola, Chief of Police
City of Milwaukee, Respondent-Appelllant.
Wisconsin Court of Appeals # 95-2856
Oral Argument 9/27/96 Decided
12/17/96
APPEAL from an order of the circuit
court for
Milwaukee County:
MICHAEL P. SULLIVAN, Judge.
Affirmed in part and modified in
part.
For the respondent-appellant the
cause was
submitted on the briefs of Grant
F. Langley,
city attorney and Susan E. Lappen,
assistant
city attorney.
There was oral argument by Susan
E. Lappen.
For the petitioners-respondents
the cause was
submitted on the briefs of David
M. Lucey and
Paul Bargren of Foley & Lardner
of Milwaukee.
There was oral argument by David
M. Lucey.
Before
Wedemeyer, P.J., Schudson and Curley,
JJ.
WEDEMEYER, P.J.
Police Chief Philip Arreola and
the City of
Milwaukee (hereinafter referred
to
collectively as "the City") appeal
from an
order issuing a writ of mandamus
requiring
the City to release certain police
documents
pursuant to an open records request
made by a
Journal/Sentinel, Inc. reporter.
The City claims the trial court
erred in
issuing the writ because the requested
records involve officer personnel
records
and, therefore, should not be released
on
public policy grounds.
Because the right of the public
to have
access to the majority of these
records
outweighs any public policy concerns
raised
by the City, we affirm in part;
and because
some of the concerns raised by
the City
outweigh the public's right to
access certain
portions of the requested records,
we modify the order in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Anne Bothwell, reporter for Journal/Sentinel,
Inc., in letters dated September
27, 1994,
and September 29, 1994, made an
open records
request for certain information
from the
Milwaukee Police Department.
Specifically, Bothwell requested:
Copies of the reports filled out
every time a
police officer discharges his or
her weapon,
from 1990 to date, and from 1980
to 1985.
I understand the department has
recently
created a "use of deadly force"
report.
I would like copies of each report
that has
been filed since the document was
created.
I also realize that, prior to the
creation of
the "use of deadly force" report,
officers
who discharged their weapons were
required
to file a report on the incident.
I'd like a copy of each report filed
to
document those incidents.
And in the alternative, Bothwell
requested:
Also, if my request for the reports
detailing
discharges of weapons and use of
deadly force
are (sic) denied, please provide
me with the
following information for each
year from 1980
to 1985, and from 1990 to the present:
- The number of times police officers
discharged their weapons
- The number of times those discharges
resulted in a person being
struck by
gunfire
- The number of times those shootings
were fatal
- The number of times those discharges
resulted in an animal being
struck
- The number of times those discharges
were
determined to be accidental
- The date, time and location of
each
occurrence
- The name, age, address, race and
sex of
each person who was shot
- The name, age, sex, race, and
length of
service with the department
of the officer
whose weapon was discharged.
- A brief description of the circumstances
under which each weapons
discharge
occurred.
The police records custodian denied
both
of Bothwell's requests by letters
dated
October 14, 1994, and January 4,
1995.
The denial letters indicated that
this
information would not be released,
stating in pertinent part:
Please be advised that your request
for copies of the aforementioned
reports is denied.
These are pending ongoing administrative
internal personnel matters.
Open or closed personnel reports
and
investigations are not subject
to disclosure
pursuant to the Open Records Act.
The Milwaukee Police Department's
ability to
conduct thorough confidential internal
investigations, including the gathering
of statements from members of the
Department
as a condition of their employment
would be
seriously hampered by disclosure
of such
investigations. . . .
In addition, we are denying disclosure
as in the case of the
Village of Butler v. Cohen,
163 Wis.2d 819,
472 N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1991).
The following are specific policy
reasons for
nondisclosure of personnel-related
material,
in that disclosure would:
(1) Run counter to the legislature's
recognition
in Section 19.85(1) Stats.,
of the need
to keep personnel records
confidential,
to maintain the
reputational
and privacy interests
of the employee;
(2) Give the requester greater access
to
the records
than the employee;
(3) Subvert the municipalities'
policy of
ensuring employees
opportunities for
satisfying careers
and fair treatment
based on value
of service;
(4) Impinge upon the officers' ability
to
have and retain
competent personnel;
(5) Prevent a reviewer from making
candid
assessments
of an officer; and
(6) Run counter to the municipalities'
interests in
maintaining the
confidentiality
of its personnel
records which
are closed under
Section 230.13(5)
Stats.
We are further denying disclosure
because
Section 103.13(2) Stats., indicates
that this
information should only be turned
over upon
the request of the employee or
pursuant to a
waiver by the employee.
Release of this information without
a waiver
would thwart the public policy
of
nondisclosure contained in
Section 103.13(2).
In addition, the State has closed
similar
records of state employee discipline
pursuant to Section 230.13(5) Stats.
We believe that, by analogy, this
is also
indicative of public policy justifying
their confidentiality.
Federal common law has further established
that these records are confidential.
See
Ballard v. Terrek,
56 F.R.D. 45 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
The City denied Bothwell's alternate
records
request as well, stating:
With regards to your request for
statistical
information, please be advised
that your
request for a copy of this information
as
afore described is denied.
Pursuant to ss 19.35(1)(L),
". . . this subsection does
not require
an authority to create
a new record by
extracting information
from existing
records and compiling
the information
in a new format."
On January 17, 1995, Journal/Sentinel,
Inc.
and Bothwell filed a petition for
a writ
of mandamus with the Circuit Court.
The City moved to quash the petition,
but this motion was denied.
The trial court held several hearings
regarding the petition, conducted
an in
camera review of a sampling of
the requested
records, and eventually issued
the writ.
Specifically, the writ ordered that
the City provide Bothwell with:
a. A copy of each report filed
every time
a police officer
discharges his or
her weapon,
from 1990 to date,
and from 1980
to 1985.
b. If different, any other
report on
the use of deadly
force for the
same time periods.
c. If different, any other
report filed
by an officer
who discharged his or
her weapon concerning
said discharge
for the same
time periods.
d. All reports summarizing
or detailing
discharges of
weapons or other use
of deadly force
for the periods 1980
to 1985 and
1990 to present which
contain all
or parts of the
following information:
(1) The number of times police officers
discharged their
weapons.
(2) The number of times these discharges
resulted in
a person being struck by
gunfire.
(3) The number of times those discharges
were fatal.
(4) The number of times those discharges
resulted in
an animal being struck.
(5) The number of times those discharges
were determined
to be accidental.
(6) The date, time and location
of
each such occurrence.
(7) The name, age, address, race
and sex
of each person
who was injured as
a result thereof.
(8) The name, age, address, race,
sex and
length of service
of the officer of the
Department whose
weapon was discharged.
(9) A brief description of the circumstances
under which
each such weapon discharge
occurred.
e. To the extent the records
reflect the
identity of
a person outside the
Milwaukee Police
Department who provided
information
to the Milwaukee Police
Department on
the subjects requested and
who requested,
at the time of providing
such information,
that his or her
identity be
kept confidential, the
information
pertaining to such person
may be expunged
prior to production.
The City now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
The City claims the records requested
involve documents generated and
maintained
solely for the purposes of personnel
evaluation and discipline.
As a result, the City maintains
that public
policy concerns outweigh the general
right of
the public to have access to these
records.
In response, Journal/Sentinel, Inc.
and
Bothwell claim that the records
are not
personnel records and that the
public's
right to access this information
outweighs
any public policy concerns.
The trial court ruled:
Okay, well, there is no more awesome
power exercised by government than
that of the police.
The police have literally the power
of life and over citizens they
are to
protect, but the power of the police
in our republic is limited.
Ours is a representative form of
government,
and in recognition of that fact,
the
Wisconsin legislature has said
at
Section 19.31 of Wisconsin statutes:
"In recognition of the fact
that a
representative government
is dependent
upon an informed electorate,
it's
declared to be the
public policy of this
State that all persons
are entitled to
the greatest possible
information
regarding the affairs
of government and
the official acts
of those officers and
employees who represent
them. . . . .
To that end, Sections
19.32 to 19.37
shall be construed
in every instance
with a presumption
of complete public
access consistent
with the conduct of
governmental business.
The denial of public
access generally
is contrary to public
interest and
only in an exceptional
case may
access be denied.
. . . . . . . "
Now, this public policy statement
must apply,
I think, with utmost vigor to the
situation
at hand where the information sought
concerns
the police exercise of its most
extreme
power, the use of deadly force.
. . . You
can't take a matter like police
discharging
its weapons and call it personnel
records
and hide it from the public.
I just don't think that's right.
The police chief, then, has to either
make
those records available to a reasonable
extent or he has to create some
other records
that the public has access to so
the public
knows whose firing the weapons,
who is firing
them, when they are being fired,
and the
general circumstances around them.
. . .
. . . Generally, you should deny
access to
the personnel files, but here there
is no
other way, it seems, for the public
to know
what's happening with the firing
of weapons
in this city, and I think the public
in this
city has an overriding concern
in having that
information available to it, and
it
overrides, unfortunately, the chief's
interest in keeping his personnel
files
private. . . .
. . . I have to agree with the plaintiff
in
this case, and I will issue the
writ of
mandamus and make that writ absolute
on the
points that you have requested,
that is, the
P-10 information where it is available,
any
statistical data that the department
has
concerning these things and before
the P-10
information was extant, the old
PI old PI-4
form. [1]
That is the order of the Court.
The review in this case involves
interpretation of statutes as applied
to
undisputed facts.
Accordingly, we will apply the de
novo
standard of review.
Bitters v. Milcut, Inc.,
117 Wis.2d 48, 49,
343 N.W.2d 418, 419 (Ct. App. 1983).
According to the open records law,
Section 19.31, Stats.,
"shall be construed in every
instance with a presumption
of complete public
access,
consistent with the
conduct
of governmental business."
See also Sections 19.32-.37, Stats.
Case law construing this statute
provides,
"`The general presumption . . .
is that
public records shall be open to
the public
unless there is a clear statutory
exception,
unless there exists a limitation
under the
common law, or unless there is
an overriding
public interest in keeping the
public record
confidential.'"
Mayfair Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
v.
Baldarotta,
62 Wis.2d 142, 156,
469 N.W.2d 638, 643 (1991).
The instant case primarily presents
an issue
with respect to the third factor.
Although both parties spend a significant
amount of time attempting to label
the
requested records as "personnel
records"
or as records that are not considered
personnel records, this categorization
is not dispositive.
Even if these records are construed
to be
personnel records, they are not
automatically
exempt from disclosure.
The issue of whether records which
are
labelled "personnel" should be
disclosed has
been addressed repeatedly in the
case law.
Village of Butler v. Cohen,
163 Wis.2d 819,
472 N.W.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1991),
this court held that public policy
favoring
nondisclosure of personnel records
outweighed
the presumption of disclosure.
Similarly, in
Pangman & Associates v. Stigler,
161 Wis.2d 828, 839,
468 N.W.2d 784, 788 (Ct. App. 1991),
and in
Pangman & Associates, S.C. v.
Zellmer,
163 Wis.2d 1070, 1083,
473 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Ct. App. 1991),
requests for personnel records of
police
officers made pursuant to the open
records
law were denied and the records
were not
released.
None of these cases, however, stands
for
the proposition that records categorized
as "personnel" records are entitled
to
a blanket exemption from disclosure.
This issue whether all
disciplinary or
personnel records of public employees
are
exempted from the open records
law was
specifically addressed and decided
by our
supreme court in
Wisconsin Newspress, Inc. v.
Sheboygan Falls School District,
199 Wis.2d 769,
199 Wis.2d 768,
546 N.W.2d 143 (1996).
In Wisconsin Newspress, our supreme
court
rejected the notion that all disciplinary
or
personnel records of public employees
are
entitled to a blanket exemption
from
the open records law.
Id.,
199 Wis.2d at 775,
546 N.W.2d at 145.
The court held that whether personnel
records
are subject to disclosure must
be examined on
a case-by-case basis.
199 Wis.2d at 781,
546 N.W.2d at 147.
Here, the City conceded that personnel
records are not automatically exempt
from
disclosure during oral argument,
but
nonetheless suggests that the City's
interests in not disclosing this
information
outweighs the public's interest
in accessing
the requested information.
In reviewing the instant case, we
apply
a balancing test to determine whether
the City is correct. [2]
199 Wis.2d at 781,
546 N.W.2d at 147.
We must determine whether the public
policies
favoring disclosure, including
the
presumption of openness as described
in
Section 19.31, Stats., are outweighed
by the
public policies favoring nondisclosure,
199 Wis.2d at 781,
546 N.W.2d at 147.
at
199 Wis.2d at 782,
546 N.W.2d at 148,
such as those raised by the City:
(1) disclosure would adversely
affect the
police
department's ability to conduct
effective
investigations;
(2) disclosure would impinge
on officers'
reputational
and privacy interests;
(3) disclosure would give
the requester
greater
access to the records
than the
employee has;
(4) disclosure would impinge
on the
department's
ability to attract
and retain
competent personnel;
(5) disclosure would discourage
victims and
witnesses
from providing information.
In applying the balancing test,
we weigh each of these countervailing
interests seriatim. [3]
We emphasize that the information
that is
subject to disclosure must be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis, and will
not be identical in every case.
Accordingly, our analysis in the
instant
case is limited to the case at
bar.
As challenges to the open records
law are
presented, the trial court should
determine
what information is subject to
disclosure
after an in camera inspection.
We emphasize the importance of this
procedure
and the need to have each case
individually
examined rather than setting forth
any
absolutes applicable to all instances
of apparent conflict. [4]
We turn now to an examination of
the
countervailing interests raised
by the City.
The City suggests that disclosing
the reports
would hamper the police department's
ability
to conduct effective investigations.
We are not persuaded that this concern
justifies blanket withholding of
all
the information requested.
First, this concern is countered
by the fact
that Journal/Sentinel, Inc. (as
argued both
in its brief and at oral argument)
is looking
for solely factual information.
Factual material gathered in connection
with
an investigation of police conduct
is
generally subject to public inspection.
See
State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens,
32 Wis.2d 11,
144 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
Further, any impact on investigations
if solely factual information is
disclosed would be remote.
These incidents are occurring in
public.
Limiting the disclosure to only
the facts
should not impact on an officer's
ability
to conduct an investigation.
This concern, however, may justify
withholding certain portions of
the documents at issue.
The portions of the reports that
are not
purely factual information may
legitimately
be withheld in order to maintain
the
effectiveness of ongoing investigations.
That is, any supervisory opinions
containing
recommendations or concerns made
for future
action or criticisms of past actions
may
legitimately be withheld.
These portions of the forms, which
required
supervising officers to render
an opinion
regarding the investigation should
be
withheld because supervisors might
be less
than candid if they know that the
documents
are subject to public disclosure.
Moreover, the need to conduct thorough
investigations and maintain the
integrity of
the investigations relative to
supervisory
opinions outweighs the presumption
that all
public records should be disclosed.
See
Zellmer,
163 Wis.2d at 1082,
473 N.W.2d at 543.
Accordingly, with respect to these
described
portions of the reports, we conclude
that the
City's concern does outweigh the
public's
right to access this information.
The remaining portions of the requested
forms, however, are not impacted
by this
concern and, therefore, must be
made
available.
The City's main argument for blanket
withholding is that the officers'
reputational and privacy interests
need to be
protected and that disclosing the
requested
reports would harm those interests.
The City suggests that recent case
law
demonstrates that our supreme court
has
placed a high priority on protecting
reputational and privacy interests.
See
Woznicki v. Erickson,
202 Wis.2d 178,
549 N.W.2d 699 (1996).
We do not disagree that Woznicki,
which held
that the open records law does
not provide a
blanket exemption for public employee
personnel records, emphasized the
importance
of protecting an individual's privacy
and
reputational interests.
Woznicki v. Erickson,
202 Wis.2d 180-181,
549 N.W.2d 700 (1996).
Nevertheless, Woznicki is very different
from
the instant case and we are therefore
not
wholly persuaded by the City's
arguments
of its application in this regard.
The instant case, unlike Woznicki,
involves police officers who are
discharging weapons in public places.
When individuals accept positions
as police
officers, they necessarily relinquish
certain privacy rights and must
be
subject to public scrutiny.
See
Wisconsin State Journal v.
University of Wisconsin-Platteville,
160 Wis.2d 31, 41,
465 N.W.2d 266, 270 (Ct. App. 1990).
As a result of their public employment,
police officers have a lower
expectation of privacy.
Wisconsin Newspress,
199 Wis.2d at 788,
546 N.W.2d at 150.
Moreover, in Woznicki, the reports
at issue
were a teacher's personnel file
and personal
phone records, which had been subpoenaed
by
the district attorney.
Woznicki v. Erickson,
202 Wis.2d 181,
549 N.W.2d 701 (1996).
The reports at issue here are factual
reports documenting police officers'
use of deadly force.
The public has a compelling interest
in
monitoring the use of deadly force
by police
officers and such interest outweighs
the
police officers' expectation of
privacy with
regard to discharging their weapons
while
working as police officers.
As aptly stated by the trial court:
There is no more awesome power exercised
by
government than that of the police.
The police have literally the power
of life
and death over citizens they are
to protect,
but the power of the police in
our republic
is limited. . . .
"In recognition
of the fact that a
representative
government is dependent
upon an
informed electorate, it's
declared
to be the public policy of this
State
that all persons are entitled to
the greatest
possible information
regarding
the affairs of government and
the official
acts of those officers and
employees
who represent them. . . . . .
To that
end, Sections 19.32 to 19.37
shall
be construed in every instance
with a
presumption of complete public
access
consistent with the conduct of
governmental
business.
The denial
of public access generally is
contrary
to public interest and only in
an exceptional
case may access be
denied.
. . . "
This public policy statement must
apply . . .
with utmost vigor to the situation
at hand
where the information sought concerns
the
police exercise of its most extreme
power,
the use of deadly force. . . .
We conclude, therefore, that under
the facts
of this case, the public policy
favoring the
right of inspection of public records
and
documents is not outweighed by
any
privacy/reputational concerns.
We do accept the City's argument,
however,
that police officers have a right
to keep
their home addresses private.
Accordingly, any forms containing
an
officer's home address should have
the
address redacted before disclosure.
We also reject the City's claim
that the
records should not be disclosed
because
disclosure would give the requestor
greater access to the records than
is available to the employee.
This argument is circular.
If the records are available to
a requestor
under the open records law, then
the employee
is also entitled to inspect the
records.
Once the records are made public,
it makes
no difference who the requestor
is.
The City next claims that disclosing
this
information would make it more
difficult to
attract and retain competent police
officers.
We reject this argument as well.
As noted by Journal/Sentinel, Inc.,
the City
fails to support this argument
with any
facts nor does it demonstrate how
this eventually would occur.
Regardless, we conclude that the
likelihood
of such a result is remote
too remote to
overcome the policy favoring disclosure
of
public records.
Police officers must necessarily
expect close
public scrutiny, especially with
respect to
incidents involving discharge of
weapons or
use of deadly force. [5]
Accordingly, it is difficult to
ascertain a
situation where qualified individuals
would
choose not to work as police officers
merely
because the public has the right
to inspect
the factual information related
to deadly
force incidents.
This concern is insufficient to
override the
strong public interest in disclosure
of the
factual reports at issue.
The City next claims that disclosing
the
requested reports will discourage
victims
and witnesses from providing information.
Again, we disagree.
There is no evidence to support
this assertion.
Moreover, in those situations where
victims/witnesses request that
their
statements be kept in strict confidence,
confidentiality can be maintained.
The trial court's writ already contains
such
a provision for redacting statements
made in
confidence and Journal/Sentinel,
Inc. accedes
that the public is not entitled
to this
information.
Therefore, we conclude that this
concern is
insufficient to outweigh the public's
compelling interest in accessing
the records.
Any confidentiality issues can be
carefully
determined, as needed, by a
document-by-document in camera
inspection.
In reviewing each of the City's
proposed
countervailing interests, we are
not
persuaded that they justify a blanket
withholding of the records at issue.
The records sought in this case
involve
records of the police exercise
of its most
extreme power, the use of deadly
force.
The public has a particularly strong
interest
in monitoring a police department's
overall
use of deadly force.
Having applied the balancing test
by
addressing all of the City's concerns
regarding withholding the records,
we
conclude that the public's particularly
strong interest in accessing the
majority of
this information is not outweighed
by any of
the concerns set forth by the City.
We do, however, conclude that certain
portions of the records may be
withheld
because the countervailing interests
raised
by the City do outweigh the public's
right to
access a certain portion of the
documents.
As noted, the public is entitled
to
inspection of all the factual information
regarding the use of deadly force.
We interpret this information to
include:
(1) who discharged a weapon;
(2) when it was discharged;
(3) the general circumstances
surrounding
the incident; and
(4) the name and identifying
information of
any victims
or witnesses, provided the
individuals
have not requested
confidentiality.
We conclude, however, that the public
is not
entitled to inspect those portions
of the
reports containing supervisory
statements
regarding conclusions, recommendations
or
other comments regarding potential
or
actual disciplinary actions.
We also conclude that officers'
home
addresses should not be subject
to disclosure.
These items must be redacted because
the
privacy concerns attached to such
outweigh
the public's right to access this
limited
information.
III. CONCLUSION
In sum, we hold that the trial court's
order
is affirmed, subject to the following
modifications: police officers'
home
addresses should be redacted from
the forms
and any supervisory conclusions,
recommendations or other comments
regarding
disciplinary action should also
be redacted
from the forms prior to disclosure.
By the Court.
Order affirmed in part and
modified in part.
[1]
These forms are also
known as "In the
Matter of" forms and
"Use of Force" forms.
The "matter of" forms,
used prior to the
middle of 1993, are
simply a narrative
description of the
event at issue, a
recounting of the
investigating officers'
findings, and a conclusion
by the
supervisor as to what
actions should be
taken with respect
to the officer who
discharged the weapon.
The "use of force"
reports, which replaced
the earlier documents,
include both a
pre-printed form with
space for a
description of the
incident, the location,
the officers involved,
the suspect and
the witnesses.
These forms also provide
a narrative
detailed description
of the incident
with a specific place
for the commanding
officer's recommendation.
[2]
Our review included
an in camera
inspection of the
sampling of
the requested records.
The general procedure
set forth for
reviewing open records
cases involves a
two-step procedure:
First, we must decide
if the trial court
correctly assessed
whether the custodian's
denial of access was
made with the
requisite specificity.
Second, we
determine whether
the stated reasons
are sufficient to
permit withholding,
itself a two-step
analysis.
Here, our inquiry is:
(1) did the trial
court make a factual
determination supported by the
record of whether the documents
implicate the public interests in
secrecy asserted by the custodians
and, if so,
(2) do the countervailing
interests
outweigh the public interest
in release.
Milwaukee Journal v.
Call,
153 Wis.2d 313, 317,
450 N.W.2d 515, 516
(Ct. App. 1989)
The first step of this
test was not
challenged
that is, neither party
disputes that there
is adequate factual
support for the trial
court's
determination that
the police record
custodian's denial
of access
was made with the
requisite specificity.
We concur with this
determination.
Accordingly, we need
to address only the
second step of the
procedure
the balancing test.
[3]
Those countervailing
interests raised by
the City not specifically
addressed in the
text of this opinion
are summarily
rejected for the reasons
explained below.
The City's claim that
disclosing these
records would affect
how a police officer
handles a situation
involving a firearm is
raised for the first
time on appeal and,
therefore, we need
not address it.
Pangman & Assocs.,
S.C. v. Zellmer,
163 Wis.2d 1070, 1085,
473 N.W.2d 538, 544
(Ct. App. 1991)
"It is not for appellate
courts to
hypothesize
or consider reasons for
not permitting
inspection which were
not presented
by the custodian."
In its initial
denial, the City raised
two additional
concerns:
(1) that disclosure
would run counter to
the municipalities' interests in
maintaining the confidentiality of
its personnel records which are
closed under Section 230.13(5),
Stats..; and
(2) that disclosure
would violate
Section 103.13(2), Stats.
We conclude that neither
justifies
withholding the records.
First, Section 230.13(5),
Stats., was
repealed and is no
longer current law.
See 1989 Act 31, Section
2522-24.
Second, the City argues
that Section
103.13(2), Stats.,
indicates that this
information should
only be turned over
upon the request of
the employee or
pursuant to a waiver
by the employee.
Although this statute
does provide
employees with the
right to inspect their
own personnel records,
it does not
prohibit the disclosure
granted in the instant
case.
We also reject the
City's argument that
federal law supports
withholding of the
requested information.
The City's argument
in this regard rests
solely on the
Ballard v. Terrak,
56 F.R.D. 45 (E.D.
Wis. 1972) case.
We have previously
rejected the
applicability of Ballard,
see
Pangman & Assocs.,
S.C.,
163 Wis.2d at 1083-84,
473 N.W.2d at 544,
and
see no reason for Ballard
to
persuade us here.
The City's reliance
on
Village of Butler v.
Cohen,
163 Wis.2d 819,
472 N.W.2d 579 (Ct.
App. 1991),
is also misplaced.
Cohen involved a much
different
factual scenario than
presented
in the instant case.
The subject records
in Cohen involved a
request for a complete
personnel file,
not for records solely
with respect
to deadly force issues.
Accordingly, Cohen
is not controlling
in the instant case.
[4]
To avoid an opinion
that is heavily
overwritten, we address
only dispositive
issues which were
specifically raised
under the facts presented.
We decline to address
any and all
additional issues
that although
not raised in the
instant case,
may surface in future
cases.
State v. Blalock,
150 Wis.2d 688, 703,
442 N.W.2d 514, 520
(Ct. App. 1989)
(cases should be decided
on the
narrowest possible
grounds);
see generally,
1 John H. Wigmore,
Evidence in Trials
at Common Law
Section 8a at 617
(3d ed. 1983)
(discussing avoidance
of
"overconsideration
of every point
of law raised in the
briefs").
[5]
We note that other
situations have
received similar treatment:
personal injury lawsuits,
1983 civil rights
claims, and
coroner's inquests.
See
Tyner v. City of Jackson,
105 F.R.D. 564 (S.D.
Miss. 1985);
Diamond v. City of
Mobile,
86 F.R.D. 324 (S.D.
Ala. 1978);
Wood v. Breier,
54 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.
Wis. 1972).
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